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Revenue Divergence and Competitive Balance in a Divisional Sports League
I Introduction
In the North American (NA) literature on resource allocation in professional team sports leagues, relative market sizes are the final arbiter of the allocation of playing talent between teams, and therefore of competitive balance (Rottenberg, 1956; El Hodiri and Quirk, 1971; Fort and Quirk, 1995; Vrooman, 1995) . Although the standard NA model is demand-driven, the empirical NA literature tends to concentrate on the link between the supply side of the players' labour market and competitive balance. For example, Scully (1989) , Fort and Quirk (1995) , Vrooman (1995) and Eckard (1998) present empirical tests of the invariance proposition: that the efficient allocation of playing talent does not depend on players'
contractual status, and is therefore unaffected by the introduction of free agency. In a recent review of this literature, Eckard (2001) finds that "(t)aken together, the results are consistent with the invariance proposition, namely, balance did not change" (p430).
The present article focuses primarily on demand-side determinants of competitive balance.
Specifically, it seeks to demonstrate and draw connections between two empirical propositions concerning professional (association) football (or soccer) in England and
Wales: 1 first, between the 1920s and 1990s there was increasing divergence in the base levels of spectator demand enjoyed by teams with distinct identifying characteristics; and second, over the same period there was increasing competitive imbalance within the league as a whole. According to the standard model, the second proposition should follow from the first.
Since long-term change in the composition of demand has been a major influence on the historical development of English football, the latter should provide a vehicle for empirical scrutiny of the theory, from a perspective that differs from that of most of the NA literature.
The key distinguishing features of the NA and European models for the organisation of professional team sports have been the subject of some discussion in the recent literature (Hoehn and Szymanski, 1999; Fort, 2000) . In the present context, the following five features appear to be most relevant: (i) English football's hierarchical divisional structure 2 ensures that membership at the highest level is open to any non-league team with sufficient talent to achieve promotion; (ii) win percent, revenue or utility maximisation subject to a financial constraint is widely assumed to describe the motivations of most English football team owners more appropriately than profit maximisation; (iii) full free agency rights for players over the age of 24 were only established relatively recently, following the European Court of Justice's 1995 Bosman ruling; (iv) relaxation of the regulations restricting the employment of foreign players, also due to the Bosman ruling, implies the market for playing talent has recently become international rather than national; and (v) geographical distances between team home towns are small, making segmentation between spectator catchment areas low and travel to home and away fixtures a practical proposition for many fans.
The content and structure of the paper are as follows. Section II discusses the adaptation of the standard NA model of resource allocation into a form suitable for the analysis of English football. Particular attention is paid to the implications for competitive balance of a team objective function of win percent maximisation subject to a financial constraint, rather than profit maximisation. Consideration is also given to the effect of the shape of the revenue function on the comparison between outcomes under these two objective functions. Section III presents estimated revenue functions for English football teams, and draws inferences about the phenomenon of revenue divergence. Section IV discusses the measurement of competitive balance between teams operating at different levels of a hierarchical, divisional league structure. A statistical analysis of win probabilities in cup ties (in which teams from different divisions meet head-on) is used to identify long-term trends in competitive balance.
Section V summarises and concludes.
II Revenue and competitive balance: theoretical considerations
Section II discusses the adaptation of the standard NA model of resource allocation in professional team sports to English football. Previously, the properties of a model of this type under an objective function of win percent maximisation subject to a zero profit (break-even) constraint have been examined by Késenne (1996) , who finds that the distribution of playing talent between teams may be more unequal than in the case of profit maximisation. In other contributions based on frameworks similar to the NA model, Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) consider the effect of the participation of the most successful football teams in European competition on competitive balance in domestic leagues, and Késenne (2000) discusses the implications for competitive balance of the introduction of a NA-style salary cap.
At a general level, the institutional, historical and economic characteristics of English football differ from those of the leading NA professional sports in respect of (at least) five major characteristics, as follows. (ii) Most NA major league sports teams are highly profitable. This is partly due to the restrictions the franchise system imposes on supply, as well as the restraining influence on wage expenditure of salary caps in football and basketball (Quirk and Fort, 1999) . A profit maximisation (PM) objective function has been adopted uncontroversially in most of the NA literature. In English football by way of contrast, the intense competitive pressure generated by the league's divisional structure has certainly contributed to the chronic loss-making propensities of most PL and FL teams. Following Sloane (1971) , most researchers have argued that win percent, revenue or utility maximisation subject to a financial constraint is a more suitable objective function than PM.
(iii) Full free agency rights for English footballers over the age of 24 were established by the 4 An open labour market may suggest a need for the relaxation of the standard model's assumption that the total supply of talent is fixed. The standard closed labour market assumption is however a reasonable description of reality for most of the period under scrutiny, and this assumption is retained in the present article. Open labour market models are discussed elsewhere by Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) and Dobson and Goddard (2001) .
(v) The standard model assumes each team's spectator demand is proportional to its hometown population: a reasonable assumption in NA where catchment areas are predominantly local (due to large distances between towns), and all but the largest cities have at most one team in each major league sport. In English football neither of these conditions pertains.
Geographical segmentation between catchment areas is less than in NA because distances are (Fort and Quirk, 2002) . The present formulation affords more flexibility, and depending on the relative magnitudes of team i's fixed costs and the loss (if any) its owner is prepared to tolerate, F i can be positive, zero or negative.
It is useful to define the marginal revenue (per incremental unit of talent employed) and average revenue (per unit of talent employed)
The elasticity of revenue with respect to talent is: In the PM models of Fort and Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (1995) , competition becomes more unbalanced if the difference between population sizes increases; in the present case the equivalent condition is an increase in the difference between A 1 and A 2 . This result follows because each team's competitive strength is proportional to its relative market size at the PM equilibrium. Competition also becomes more unbalanced if the elasticity of revenue with respect to win ratio increases; here the equivalent condition is an increase in ε(L i ). If this elasticity increases, it is efficient for the big-city team to employ more talent and the smalltown team less, because the former's revenue gain exceeds the latter's loss.
Under WM p adjusts to p + such that:
. Fort and Quirk (2002) show that depending on the precise nature of the revenue and cost assumptions, competition may be more balanced, equally balanced or less balanced under WM than it is under PM. However, by imposing certain restrictions on the revenue and cost functions, specific comparisons can be drawn in a number of particular cases, as follows.
Case 1: F 1 =F 2 =0 (zero fixed costs). The WM equilibrium condition reduces to AR 1 ( Case 2: F 1 =F 2 =F≠0 (non-zero fixed costs are the same for both teams). The WM equilibrium condition simplifies to AR 1 ( The estimated revenue functions reported in section III provide empirical evidence concerning the shape of the revenue function for PL and FL member teams, and a specific test to distinguish between the cases ε'>0, ε'=0 and ε'<0. The outcome of this test will also permit a narrowing of the range of empirically relevant comparisons between competitive balance under the PM and WM objective functions.
III Empirical revenue functions for English football
Section III reports empirical counterparts of the theoretical revenue functions developed in section II. The data comprises annual gate revenues for all PL and FL football teams between the 1926-7 and 1998-9 seasons inclusive, obtained from the FL's archives and Football Trust (various issues). For most of this period, gate revenue was by far the most important component of total revenue. Recently, however, the share of gate revenue in total revenue has fallen, and the rate of decline has been faster in the PL than in the FL. For recent years gate revenue data will therefore tend to yield a conservative estimate of the overall extent of revenue divergence.
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To describe the main changes in the distribution of revenue between teams with broadly similar demographic, geographic and historical characteristics, Dobson and Goddard (1998) classify the PL and FL member teams into five groups. G1 (Group 1) contains four major London teams that tend to attract significant levels of support from all parts of London and beyond, and ten major teams from five other cities with populations larger than 500,000:
Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, Manchester and Sheffield. G2 contains teams from northern and midlands cities with populations in the range 250,000-500,000. G3 contains teams from southern towns other than London, and the minor London teams not included in G1. The two remaining groups contain teams from smaller northern and midlands towns, sub-divided into pre-1922 (G4) and post-1922 (G5) league entrants.
transport enabled big-city teams, in particular, to begin to draw support at a national rather than purely local or regional level, and to drain support from small-town teams. Demographic change also tended to weaken links between communities and their local teams.
Suburbanisation implied population shifts away from urban districts where most stadia were located. Meanwhile the expanding reach of televised football focused public attention on a handful of star players of the most glamorous teams, also favouring the latter at the expense of their less widely exposed small-town counterparts.
The effects of such developments are incorporated into the empirical revenue functions reported below by permitting variation over time and between groups in the revenue function parameters. In the empirical revenue functions, R i,t and L i,t are equivalent to R i (revenue) and L i (normalised league position as a measure of talent) as defined in section II; and r i,t =
R is team i's normalised revenue (actual revenue as a proportion of total league revenue). In view of the importance attached to the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis in the sports economics literature (Humphreys, 2002) , the following measure of the closeness of competition within each division in each season is also included as a revenue function covariate: v i,t = the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean) of the points totals of all teams in team i's division in season t's final divisional table. The empirical revenue function specification is as follows:
where u i,t is a random disturbance term, and α i,t , β t , δ t and φ t are time-varying revenue function parameters. For estimation, some restrictions on these parameters are required: each is assumed to be polynomial in t. 10 In this formulation, the elasticity of revenue with respect to league position, the equivalent of ε(L i ) in section II, is β t + 2δ t ln (L i,t 
IV Measuring competitive balance using FA Cup match results data
In the empirical NA team sports literature, it is standard practice to measure competitive balance using the cross-sectional variance or standard deviation of the win ratios of member teams (Fort and Quirk, 1995; Eckard, 1998 Eckard, , 2001 Humphreys, 2002) . This procedure is unsuitable for English football, however, because of its divisional competitive structure.
Intra-divisional variation in win ratios may say something about competitive balance across the league as a whole: greater imbalance might be discernible within divisions to some
extent. Yet such measures are unlikely to provide a powerful measure. Most of the action is inter-rather than intra-divisional, but inter-division variation is not considered.
However, all PL and FL member teams take part in a competition that does allow direct comparisons between the playing strengths of teams from different divisions. The FA Cup (Football Association Challenge Cup) is a sudden-death knock-out tournament involving both league and non-league teams. For spectators, a major attraction is the cup's propensity to produce shock results, such as the elimination of a PL team by an opponent from the lower reaches of the FL or from non-league. Since the rules concerning match duration differ between first matches and replays, the parameters of the ordered probit model also differ, and separate estimations are required. The estimated home win, draw and away win probabilities are
Φ is the standard normal distribution function; z=1 denotes a first match; and z=2 denotes a replay. Let E(y i,j,t ) represent the expected outcome for team i after the first match or after the (first) replay if the first match is drawn, calculated as a probability-weighted average of scores of 1 if team i wins the tie; 0.5 if the tie is level; and 0 if team i loses:
If team i initially plays away to team j, the expected outcome for team i is 1 -E(y j,i,t ). Team
i's expected outcome, conditional on league positions but unconditional on which team initially plays at home, is w t (L i,t , L j,t ) = 0.5{1 + E(y i,j,t ) -E(y j,i,t )}. γ both tend to increase in absolute value.
14 Cup results have therefore become increasingly correlated with league positions. By the end of the period, any given difference in league positions counted for more than it had in earlier times, suggesting increasing competitive imbalance between teams at different levels of the league hierarchy.
Panels (d) and (e) of Table 2 percentile of the league hierarchy, against teams positioned at the 75th and 90th percentiles respectively, conditional on league positions but unconditional on home advantage. These data show that the probability of a shock result declined considerably over the period.
For selected seasons, panel (e) of Table 2 reports s(w t ) as defined above. The full series is plotted in Figure 3 . According to the theoretical models described in section II, the trend in including responsibility for all aspects of team affairs and the acquisition and disposal of players, first began to evolve between the wars (Walvin, 1994) . As the style of management of the leading teams (in particular) moved onto a more professional footing, it is unsurprising to find the emergence of a larger competitive gap between these teams and the rest. imbalance. However, as noted above it is also likely that the gate revenue data understates the full extent of revenue divergence in the 1990s. Therefore further change in the composition of demand, not fully reflected in s(w t ), may also have contributed to rising competitive imbalance during this period.
V Conclusion
The theoretical model of resource allocation in professional sports leagues widely used in
North America suggests that competitive balance is demand-driven. Ultimately, the allocation of playing talent between teams is dependent on each team's relative market size. This article has considered the adaptation of theoretical models developed in North America to English (association) football. Empirical football team revenue functions have been reported, estimated using annual data from the 1920s to the 1990s. A direct measure of competitive balance between teams at all levels of the league's divisional hierarchy, based on a statistical analysis of match results cup competition, has been developed.
The theoretical model predicts that under profit maximising assumptions, competition will become more unbalanced, either if there is divergence between teams' base levels of spectator demand, or if the elasticity of team revenue with respect to league position increases. Empirically, both of these conditions have been met. Big-city teams experienced an increase in their base levels of demand relative to their small-town counterparts, and there was divergence in revenue shares. For the league's median team, the estimated elasticity of revenue increased over the period as a whole.
In general, the comparison between competitive balance at the equilibria associated with profit maximisation (PM) on the one hand, and win percent maximisation subject to a financial constraint (WM) on the other, is indeterminate. Depending on the precise nature of the revenue functions and cost assumptions, competition may be more balanced, equally balanced or less balanced under WM than under PM. However, a finding that the empirical revenue function is more elastic (with respect to league position) for teams near the top of the league than for teams near the bottom reduces the range of empirically relevant comparisons.
If the sum of fixed costs and the profit constraint is zero for both teams, competition is more season, all teams were members of the FL and the divisions were numbered 1 to 4.
3. L i is discrete, while talent is normally assumed to be continuous. When n is large, however, the distinction becomes negligible. L is required.
7.
In the case F 1 =F 2 =F, if F>0 and ε'≤0, AR 1 (
L is required to satisfy the WM equilibrium condition. If F<0 and ε'>0, AR 1 (
L is required. In the case F 1 ≠F 2 , if F 1 <F 2 , F 2 >0 and ε'≤0, AR 1 (
L is required. If F 1 >F 2 , F 1 >0 and ε'>0, AR 1 (
L is required.
8.
While total revenue (from all sources) would be preferable in many respects to gate revenue, the former is only obtainable from company accounts, and many teams have not filed accounts regularly. Advantages of the gate revenue data set include comprehensiveness and consistency: there are no missing observations, and all data are compiled on an identical basis in accordance with league regulations. 
12.
The polynomial functional form is:
. In this expression g 0,0 is redundant and is set to zero. Ordered probit regression is used to obtain estimates of the parameters µ 1 , µ 2 , g k,m , and therefore γ k,t . Chi-square tests for the joint significance of the additional coefficients introduced by increasing M 4 , based on the omitted variables version of Weiss's (1997) 14.
There is some ambiguity in the results for t , 1 γ in the replays estimation, which is based on fewer observations than the estimation for first matches. In this case there is a form of selection bias against teams from the lower reaches of the FL, relatively few of which survive to contest a replay having been drawn away in the first match.
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. Eckard (2001) argues along similar lines that a lack of player mobility prevented the NA major league baseball players' labour market from functioning in accordance with the standard resource allocation model prior to the 1976 introduction of free agency. 
